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Proposals to make deposit insurance risk-based need to consider how premiums would
fluctuate over the business cycle. This paper derives a new deposit insurance contract that has the
following three features: 1) it is fairly priced in the sense that the insurer conveys no subsidy to
the bank; 2) the insurance rate can be made as stable as desired by lengthening the “average”
maturity of the contract; 3) the rate can be frequently updated as new information regarding the
bank’s financial condition is obtained. These characteristics are achieved with a contract that is a
combination of several long-term ones whose contract intervals partially overlap. Relative to a
standard, short-term contract, this “moving average” contract reduces the volatility of a bank’s
insurance rates and avoids payment of excessively high premiums during times of financial
distress.
Estimates of fair insurance rates under such a contract are presented for 42 banks based
on data over the period 1987 to 1996. While lengthening the average maturity of the contract
reduces the volatility of insurance rates, it also increases the average level of rates since the
insurer requires a greater premium for systemic risk. The paper also finds that the distribution of
fair insurance rates across banks is skewed, with most banks paying relatively low rates and a
small minority of banks paying much higher ones.Bank Deposit Insurance and Business Cycles:
Controlling the Volatility of Risk-Based Premiums
I. Introduction
Over the past decade, a number of countries began charging deposit insurance premiums
that depend on the risk characteristics of individual banks.
1 Included among them is the United
States, which was required to institute risk-based pricing by the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). By setting a bank’s insurance premium to
reflect its risk of default, a risk-based premium could mimic a market default risk-premium that
the bank would pay in the absence of deposit insurance. This replication of market default-risk
premiums could mitigate distortions in terms of bank risk-taking and deposit issue and would
reduce cross-subsidization between safe and risky banks.
Recently, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) performed a major study of
the U.S. deposit insurance system.
2 While supposedly risk-based, the current system had over 90
percent of U.S. banks paying zero premiums for insurance. This was due to two flaws. First, the
system specified crude risk classifications that placed almost all banks in the lowest (safest) class,
thereby making them eligible for the smallest premium. Second, FDICIA and the Deposit
Insurance Funds Act of 1996 mandated that premiums be used to stabilize the reserves of the
FDIC’s Bank Insurance Fund (BIF).
3 Premiums had to be reduced (increased) when BIF reserves
exceeded (fell below) 1.25 % of insured deposits. Since the current BIF reserves to insured
1 Garcia (2000) reports that by the year 2000, 24 out of 67 countries surveyed had deposit insurance
systems that assessed risk-based premiums.
2 This study is summarized in FDIC (2000).
3 BIF reserves are the accumulated value of premiums previously paid by commercial banks less the value
of FDIC losses from past bank failures.2
deposits ratio exceeded the designated reserve ratio (DRR) of 1.25 %, premiums were eliminated
for the safest banks in an attempt to return the ratio back to its target.
4
This recent experience makes clear that premiums cannot be set to both stabilize BIF
reserves and fairly price potential insurer losses from a bank’s failure. BIF reserves depend on
past losses from banking industry failures while risk-based premiums ought to reflect the
likelihood of future losses from individual banks’ failures. Recognition of this led the FDIC to
recommend that it be permitted to charge risk-based premiums that are independent of fund
reserves.
5 Such a reform also could reduce large swings in insurance rates since the current
system requires little premiums when banking industry losses are low (and reserves are above the
DRR) but potentially large premiums when industry losses are high (and reserves are below the
DRR). Moreover, as argued in FDIC (2001, p.5), this volatility can harm the real economy:
“…banks are likely to be faced with very steep deposit insurance payments when
earnings are already depressed. Such premiums would divert billions of dollars
out of the banking system and raise the cost of gathering deposits at a time when
credit already might be tight. This, in turn, could cause a further cutback in
credit, resulting in a further slowdown of economic activity at precisely the
wrong time in the business cycle.”
Making premiums independent of fund reserves eliminates one source of counter-cyclical
movements in premiums, but risk-based pricing could create another. If a bank’s financial
condition worsens in economic downturns, its fair insurance premium will tend to rise.
6 Hence, a
switch to true risk-based pricing may not alleviate potential credit crunches.
4 The FDIC also maintains a separate reserve fund for thrift institutions, known as the Savings Association
Insurance Fund (SAIF). At the time, it was also above its DRR, and over 90 percent of thrifts were also
paying zero insurance premiums.
5 If maintaining an insurance fund with a stable DRR is desired, it could be done with a separate
rebate/assessment scheme that would not depend on banks’ current risks or their current levels of deposits.
See Wilcox (2001) for an example of such a proposal.
6 The analysis in Pennacchi (1999) confirms that premiums set to target fund reserves are positively
correlated with hypothetical fair insurance premiums, and both are counter-cyclical.3
One contribution of the current paper is to show how fair insurance premiums might be
structured to reduce their volatility over business cycles. Two previous papers also have
proposed reforming deposit insurance with an aim toward reducing the volatility of insurance
rates. Konstas (1992) and Shaffer (1997) advocate similar systems in which premiums would be
set to a long-term moving average of past FDIC insurance expenses (historical losses from bank
failures). The proposal in the current paper is related to these, but with a significant difference.
Rather than being a moving average of past FDIC losses, the moving average is forward looking:
insurance rates are a moving average of the value of the FDIC’s exposure to future losses.
Specifically, this study presents a new model for pricing deposit insurance that has the following
features:
1. A bank’s insurance rate is risk-based and “fair” in the sense that it contains no
subsidy. The Federal government, representing taxpayers, obtains fair compensation
for providing insurance to the bank’s depositors.
2. The fair insurance rate can be made as stable as desired by lengthening the “average”
maturity of the insurance contract.
3. The insurance rate can be updated at regular intervals as new information on the
bank’s financial condition is obtained from Call Reports and/or bank examinations.
The key to making insurance rates fair, stable, yet frequently updated is to structure a
bank’s deposit insurance as a combination of several long-term contracts whose contract intervals
partially overlap. To illustrate this idea, suppose that a deposit insurer updates a bank’s insurance
premium once per year, and the initial terms of the overlapping insurance contracts are n years,
where n is an integer ≥ 1. Then a bank’s deposit insurance can be de-composed into n insurance
contracts, where each lasts n years and covers 1
n
th of the bank’s total insured deposits. If we
denote the current date as 0 and measure dates in years, then the most recently updated contract
covers the interval from date 0 to date n. The contract updated one year ago covers the interval4
f r o md a t e– 1t od a t en-1, while the contract updated two years ago covers the interval from date –
2t od a t en-2. Thus, the oldest contract, updated n-1 years ago, covers the interval from date n-1
to date 1. Figure 1 illustrates this overlapping of contracts for the case of n =5 .
If each of the n contracts assigns an initially fair annual premium to its 1
n
th share of the
bank’s deposits, the overall set of contracts provides no subsidy. At a given date, the bank’s total
insurance premium per deposit is the average of the n different rates. Importantly, as n increases,
the bank’s total premium becomes less volatile, since new information affects only a 1
n
th share of
deposits the next time the premium is revised. However, as time passes, more of the individual
contracts mature and are re-priced, so that the total premium eventually reflects changes the
bank’s financial condition. Still, this “moving average” of multiple overlapping contracts
provides intertemporal smoothing of rates relative to a short-term contract that fully re-prices
annually.
7
A bank insured by this moving average contract is analogous to a firm with uninsured
debt comprised of n different bonds, with each bond having an initial maturity of n years but
having been issued at different, consecutive prior annual dates. Each year, one of the firm’s
bonds matures, and it rolls it over into a new n-year maturity bond. If investors price each new
bond fairly based on the firm’s financial risk, then the firm’s interest expense, including the
premium it pays for default risk, is a moving average of interest expenses from its n different
bonds.
To calculate actual insurance premiums for banks under this moving average framework,
values for each of the overlapping contracts must be determined. This requires specifying a risk-
based insurance pricing model for these underlying contracts.
8 In this paper, we consider two
related models. The first calculates premiums for each overlapping contract based on a structural
7 Estimates of deposit insurance rates that assume an annually re-priced contract include studies by Marcus
and Shaked (1984), Ronn and Verma (1986), and Giammarino, Schwartz, and Zechner (1989).
8 FDIC (2000,2001) discusses a variety of risk-based pricing methods.5
option pricing-type model. We refer to premiums calculated in this model as “fair” in the sense
that they provide no subsidy to banks and would replicate premiums charged by competitive
private insurers. The second method is the same as the first except that premiums are set to cover
the expected value of future deposit insurance losses for each overlapping contract.
9 These
“expected value” premiums differ from the first method’s “fair premiums” in that they do not
provide compensation for the insurer’s exposure to systemic risk. Since bank failures tend to be
counter-cyclical, increasing during recessions and declining during expansions, a fair deposit
insurance rate includes a positive market risk premium that expected value insurance rates lack.
The paper’s empirical work shows that the size of this systemic risk premium increases with a
bank’s probability of default and the length, n, of the overlapping contract.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section details the specific assumptions for
valuing insurance, derives fair and expected value deposit insurance premiums, and describes
how these premiums can be calculated. Section III presents empirical results for a sample of 42
commercial banks. Conclusions are given in section IV.
II. The Insurance Valuation Model
Our method for valuing each overlapping contract is similar to Cooperstein, Pennacchi,
and Redburn (1995) and Pennacchi (1999) but allows for stochastic interest rates and an
exogenous loss rate by the FDIC following a bank’s failure. Recent credit risk models such as
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) also assume an
exogenous loss or write-down rate by a bankrupt firm’s creditors.
10 These papers justify this
assumption by noting that during bankruptcy a firm’s assets are rarely allocated according to
9 Kuritzkes, Schuermann, and Weiner (2001) provide another method for computing deposit insurance
premiums that equal the expected value of losses.
10 In these papers, default occurs when a firm’s assets reach a specified lower threshold. Bondholders then
recover (1-ω) times the value of a default-free bond, where ωis the exogenous write-down or loss rate. As
does the current paper’s model, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) permit a firm’s leverage to be mean-
reverting. Our empirical evidence, as well as that in Ashcraft (2001), supports the existence of mean-
reversion in banks’ capital ratios.6
absolute priority rules. Rather, creditor recoveries are often the outcome of a complex bargaining
process. As we discuss in more detail below, assuming an exogenous loss rate for the FDIC is
attractive due to the increasing complexity of bank liabilities.
The insurance valuation model makes the following five assumptions:
A.1 Default-free bond price process: Define Pt(τ) as the date t price of a default-free zero-
coupon bond that pays $1 at date t+τ. The value of this bond follows the process
( )/ ( ) (, ) ( ) tt p p dP P t dt dq ττ α τσ τ =+ (1)
where dq is a Brownian motion process, αp(t,τ) is the bond’s expected rate of return, and σp(τ) is
the standard deviation of the bond’s rate of return. σp(τ) is an increasing function of the bond’s
time until maturity, τ, and ()
0 lim 0 p τ στ
↓ = .
This specification of bond price dynamics is assumed in Merton (1973), Vasicek (1977),
and Hull and White (1990). From (1) we can define the instantaneous maturity (short-term)
default-free interest rate as ()




A.2 Bank asset return generating process: Let Vt be the date t market value of a bank’s assets,
where assets are broadly construed to include off-balance sheet contracts and “charter” value
associated with market power in lending or deposit issue. The rate of return on bank assets
satisfies
/( ) tt v v dVV t d t d z ασ =+ (2)
where dz is another Brownian motion process that is correlated with dq such that dzdq = ρdt, ρ
being the processes’ instantaneous correlation coefficient. αv is the expected rate of return on
11 In equilibrium term structure models, αp(t,τ)=rt + λσp(τ)w h e r eλ is the market price of interest rate risk
associated with dq. For example, the Vasicek (1977) model assumes dr = κ(θ-r)dt -σdq and results in bond
prices equal to Pt(τ)=A(τ)e
-B(τ)r where A(τ) ≡ exp{(B(τ)-τ)[θ+λσ/κ -½ ( σ/κ)
2-(σB(τ))
2/(4κ)]} and B(τ) ≡ (1-
e
-κτ)/ κ.7
bank assets, and σvis the standard deviation of the rate of return on bank assets, which is
constant over each yearly interval.
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A.3 Liability return generating process: A bank’s total non-ownership liabilities are assumed to
earn a market rate of return satisfying
/( ) tt d d dDD t d t d q ασ =+ (3)
Since a bank’s liabilities are a portfolio of fixed-income securities, their value depends on
the same source of risk as other bond-like instruments. Hence, the bond and bank liability
processes of (1) and (3) are both driven by the same Brownian motion process, dq. We follow
Pennacchi (1987a,b) by assuming that the sensitivity of the bank’s total liabilities to changes in
interest rates is constant, that is, σd is fixed. This implies that the bank maintains a constant
duration or “effective maturity” for its liabilities.
13 Consistent with A.1, σd is an increasing
function of the duration of the bank’s liabilities, and for the special case of a zero duration (all
liabilities re-price instantaneously), σd =0a n dαd(t)=rt.
Equations (2) and (3) determine the primary sources of uncertainty affecting the rate of
return on bank assets and liabilities. As a special case, if a bank’s assets consist entirely of a
portfolio of default-free fixed income securities, such as Treasury bonds, default-free mortgages,
or mortgage-backed securities, this would correspond to ρ =1a n dσv would measure the
sensitivity of bank assets to interest rate changes. The difference between σv and σd would reflect
the bank’s mismatch in the duration of its assets and liabilities and would measure of the interest
12 σvcould be allowed to change from year to year as a function of the bank’s end-of-year asset/liability
ratio. Our empirical work assumes it is constant.
13 Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1979) define the duration of a fixed-income portfolio as the maturity of the
zero-coupon bond that has the same interest rate risk as this portfolio. Thus, if σd = σd
*, then the duration
of bank liabilities is defined as the maturity, τ
*, of the zero-coupon bond that has the same risk, that is,
σp(τ
*)= σd
*. In the case of the Vasicek (1977) model whereσp(τ)=σ(1-e
-κτ )/κ, this implies τ
* =- ( 1 / κ)ln(1-
κσd
*/σ).8
rate risk of the bank’s net worth. For the general case of imperfect correlation between bank
assets and liabilities, |ρ| < 1, the bank’s assets are exposed to additional sources of risk, such as
credit risk or risk from changes in the market value of derivative positions.
A.4 Behavior of bank regulators: Define a bank’s asset/liability ratio as xt ≡ Vt/Dt. The bank is
audited at the end of each year and, if at that time xt < φ, it is closed.
14 When a bank of type b is
closed, the deposit insurer incurs an expense for resolving the failed bank that is assumed to
equal a given proportion, fb, of the failed bank’s liabilities. Thus, if the bank fails at date T, the
insurer experiences a loss equal to
T bT Ff D = (4)
Unlike previous deposit insurance pricing models that relate the FDIC’s loss to the failed
bank’s assets and various classes of liabilities, (4) follows the spirit of Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995) in assuming an FDIC loss rate that is the same for all banks of a particular type.
15 This
simplification is motivated by the difficulty of specifying FDIC losses in terms of the assets,
deposits, and other senior and junior liabilities of the failed bank. As with non-banking firms,
absolute priority of liabilities effectively is violated when a bank fails because many uninsured
liabilities can withdraw or secure their claims shortly before the bank is closed. Such incentives
probably have been amplified since national depositor preference legislation was adopted in
1993. This law raised domestic depositors’ claims on a failed bank’s assets above those of
foreign depositors and general creditors. Its effect on the level of FDIC losses has been subject to
debate, a debate that has yet to be resolved by experience, since only a few small banks have
14 φ is assumed to be close to 1. Its actual value will depend on how quickly regulators act to close weak
banks. While legislation mandates closure when a bank’s book value capital ratio equals 2 percent, its
contemporaneous market value capital ratio, xt – 1, typically could be less.
15 Exogenous loss rates also are assumed in “reduced-form” models which specify default as a Poisson
process with a stochastic default intensity or hazard rate. An example is Duffie and Singleton (1999).9
failed since the law’s passage.
16 Specifying the appropriate loss rate, fb, for a particular bank
type, b, is left for future research.
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A.5 Other activities of banks: Immediately following regulators’ audit of the bank at the end of
each year, if the bank is allowed to remain in operation, then the following three discrete
adjustments occur:1 )Liabilities grow discretely at the rate gd:
(1 ) d t t Dg D +− =+ (5)
where Dt- denotes the value of the bank’s liabilities just prior to their growth at date t while Dt+
denotes the value of bank liabilities just after date t;2 )A deposit insurance premium equal to Ht
Dt+ is paid;
18 3) The bank adjusts its asset / liability ratio, either by issuing new equity
repurchasing stock, and/or paying dividends so as to move partially toward its target
capital/asset ratio. Specifically, if xt- = Vt-/Dt+ is the bank’s asset/liability ratio just prior to the
adjustment, x* is the bank’s target ratio, and xt+ = Vt+/Dt+ is the bank’s asset/liability ratio
following the adjustment, then the end-of-period asset/liability ratio satisfies
19
() *
t tt xx x x κ +− − =+ − (6)
16 Marino and Bennett (1999) review this issue and related empirical findings. Ceteris paribus, the higher
priority of the FDIC’s insured deposit claim should lower its losses. However, the FDIC’s losses could
increase if uninsured liability holders react by shortening their claims’ maturities or switching to secured
(collateralized) liabilities.
17 A bank’s type could depend on its proportions of insured deposits, uninsured domestic and foreign
deposits, senior non-deposit liabilities, junior (subordinated) non-deposit liabilities, and other
characteristics such as the bank’s size and location. The loss rate for each type can be estimated from
historical FDIC experience, adjusted, perhaps, for changes in depositor preference and regulations such as
the prompt corrective action mandates contained in the 1991 FDIC Improvement Act. Our empirical work
specifies fb based on the FDIC’s historical loss rates for banks categorized by size. If future loss rates are
similar to those of the past, our less complicated modeling may give reasonably accurate estimates of the
FDIC’s liability.
18 Ht is the premium as a proportion of total bank liabilities. The premium as a proportion of total domestic
deposits would equal Ht times the ratio of the bank’s total liabilities to domestic deposits. Note that HtDt is
the actual premium paid by the bank, which may differ from the fair premium calculated below.
19 Vt-is the value of the bank’s assets prior to paying its insurance premium while Vt+ is the bank’s assets
after having paid its insurance premium and making its adjustments to capital. Thus the implicit
assumption in the mean-reverting process (6) is that the bank raises sufficient (additional) capital to cover10
Equations (2) and (3) characterize the rates of return on the existing stocks of bank assets
and liabilities, but the value of assets and liabilities can change due to inflows and outflows.
Specifically, dividend payments, equity (capital) share issues and repurchases, payment of bank
deposit insurance premiums, and net new deposit growth will change the total quantity of a
bank’s assets and/or liabilities. For analytical simplicity, we assume that these sources and uses
of funds take place at a single point in time and lead to the adjustments given in (5) and (6).
In summary, the following sequence of events is assumed to occur each year:
1. Starting from their beginning-of-year values, the market values of bank assets and deposits
change stochastically during the year following the rate of return processes given in equations
(2) and (3).
2. At the end of the year, regulators audit the bank and determine whether it should be closed.
If the bank is closed, the deposit insurer’s payment required to resolve the failure equals the
expression in (4).
3. If regulators allow the bank to continue operating, then end-of-year liabilities grow discretely
according to equation (5), a deposit insurance premium is paid, and bank assets change due to
share purchases and/or dividend payments so as to adjust the bank’s capital/asset ratio
according to (6). Starting again at 1., the events are repeated for the following year.
Given the previous assumptions, we can now derive an insurer’s liability for guaranteeing
the deposits of a particular bank for a period of n years. We next determine the annual insurance
premium that the bank would need to pay to cover this n-year liability. Lastly, we derive this
bank’s required insurance premium when its insurance plan is a moving average of n overlapping
contracts.
payment of its insurance premium. This assumption simplifies our analysis because changes in bank
capital are independent of the size of insurance premiums.11
Denote the current date as 0 and define l0n as the insurer’s liability for the possible failure
of the bank occurring at only date n, which currently is exactly n years in the future.
20 This
liability, l0n, is a contingent claim whose value depends on the bank’s assets and liabilities.
Recognizing this allows us to apply standard asset pricing theory. The premise of this theory is
that the equilibrium values of all assets and liabilities should not permit arbitrage opportunities,
or, equivalently, that assets having the same risk should possess the same premium for risk.
Let us first consider a hypothetical bond mutual fund that invests in default-free bonds
having the same duration as that of the bank’s total liabilities, and denote the fund’s date t share
price as Bt. Because this mutual fund’s duration equals that of the bank’s liabilities, its rate of
return process is the same as that of Dt given in equation (3). If, with no loss of generality, we
assume that B0 = D0, then the only difference between the values of Bt and Dt is that total
liabilities, Dt, grow discretely at rate gd at the end of each year that the bank has not been closed.
This implies that at some beginning-of-year date, t =1, 2, …, for which the bank is still in
operation, Dt = Bt(1+gd)
t-1.
Next, let us normalize (deflate) the value of the insurer’s liability by this bond fund’s
share price, Bt.
21 It can be shown that the absence of arbitrage opportunities in the original non-
normalized price system implies an absence of arbitrage in this normalized price system and,















Qdenotes the date 0 expectation operator under the equivalent martingale probability
measure Q, also known as the “risk-neutral” probability measure. Equation (7) can be simplified
20 Recall the assumption that banks are audited, and possibly closed, at the end of each year.
21 The idea for such a normalization technique can be traced to Merton (1973) and Margrabe (1978). Lewis
and Pennacchi (1999) perform a similar normalization in the context of valuing guarantees of pension
benefits.12
because assumption A.4 states that if the bank fails at date n, then the insurer’s loss would equal
fbDn. Otherwise, its loss at date n is zero. Failure at date n would occur if xt ≥ φ for t =1 ,… ,n-1,
but xn < φ.
Define p0n as the date 0 probability under measure Q that this set of events occurs,
namely, xt ≥ φ for t =0 ,1 ,… ,n-1, but xn < φ. Shortly, we will discuss how this risk-neutral
failure probability can be computed, but for now, we emphasize that p0n differs from the true
probability of failure because it accounts for a risk premium. Given this definition of p0n,
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Next, if we define L0n as the value of an insurance contract that extends from the current
date up until and including date n, then this n-period contract has a value that is simply the sum of
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Consistent with A.5, suppose that the bank is charged annual insurance premiums to
cover this n-period contract. Conditional on the bank having not failed beforehand, it would pay
a premium at date t equal to h0nDt, t= 0 ,1 ,… ,n-1. The value of these contingent premium
payments can be derived in a manner similar that of the insurer’s liability. Defining v0t as the
value of the single premium that the bank promises to pay at date t, it equals
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where, assuming the bank is currently in operation, p00 = 0. Hence, the value of the sum of the
annual promised premiums from dates 0 to n-1 is given by
() ()
11
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To determine the fair annual insurance premium that would set the insurer’s net liability
to zero for this n-year contract, we equate the value of the insurer’s gross liability, L0n, in equation
































Finally, the total premium for an n-year moving average insurance contract, that is, a
contract composed of n overlapping contracts, each covering 1
n
th of losses, can be calculated.















To complete this derivation of a moving average insurance premium, a bank’s risk-
neutral failure probabilities, p0i, i =1 ,… ,n, in equation (13) need to be specified. As a prelude,
we discuss how the bank’s actual or “physical” probabilities of failure can be computed.
Computing a bank’s risk-neutral failure probabilities are done in a similar manner. While the
risk-neutral probabilities are required for valuing the insurer’s liability, the physical probabilities
may be of interest in their own right. They may be helpful in calibrating the model’s closure
point, φ, to make the model’s implied frequency of bank failures match an historical failure rate.
Also, if one substitutes the physical probabilities for the risk-neutral probabilities in equations
(13) and (14), the resulting insurance premiums equal the expected loss of the deposit insurer
discounted at a riskless rate. While such premiums allow the government insurer to “break-even”
on average, they fail to incorporate a premium for the systemic risk to which taxpayers are14
exposed. Bazelon and Smetters (1999) discuss the distortions that arise when government
projects are discounted by a rate that fails to account for systemic risk.
A bank’s failure probabilities are determined by the joint distribution of its end-of-year
asset liability ratios, x1, x2,… ,xn-1,a n dxn, which are generated by the processes (2), (3), and (6).
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2 -2 σvd,a n ddw is a standard Brownian
m o t i o np r o c e s se q u a lt o( σvdz-σddq)/σx. Note from equation (15) that if the bank’s liabilities are
of short duration, then σd≈ 0, σvd≈ 0, and αd ≈ rt. In this case, the expected rate of change in the
bank’s asset-liability ratio, αx, equals the risk-premium on bank assets, αv(t)-rt.
Given estimates for αv, αd, σv, σd,a n dσvd, equations (15) and (6) could be used to
calculate the bank’s actual probability of failure for each future date. If a model such as Vasicek
(1977) is assumed to hold, then αx and σx are constants and beginning-to-end-of-year changes in
xt are lognormally distributed. Starting from an initial asset-liability ratio, x0, a random number
generator can be used to calculate an end-of-year value, x1, and, if x1 ≥ φ, it would then change
according to (6) and another lognormal random number would be used to generate a value for the
end of the next year, x2. This procedure would be repeated for all future years as long as xt ≥ φ .
If xt < φ at some future date t, this would be noted as a failure at that date and the sequence would
end. By starting from the same x0 and simulating another path x1, x2,… ,xt, … multiple times, the
proportion of these sequences for which failure occurs at a particular date, t, can be calculated.
For a sufficiently large number of sequences, this proportion becomes an accurate measure of the
true probability of failure at date t.15
Calculating a bank’s “risk-neutral” probability of failure, that is, the probability under the
Q measure, is similar to that of calculating the true or “physical” failure probability, but with one
important difference. The process used to simulate future asset-liability ratios, xt,i sg i v e nb y
equation (15) but with αx = 0, rather than αx= αv-αd+σd
2-σvd. Beginning-to-end-of-year changes
in xt continue to be lognormally distributed, but the expected rate of change is now zero rather




2-σvd > 0, the simulated risk-neutral distributions for x1, x2,… ,xn will tend have
greater probability mass in smaller values of the xt’s relative to the simulated physical
distributions for x1, x2,… ,xn. Hence, the risk-neutral probability of avoiding failure (survival
probability) over any given horizon, () 0 1 1
n
i i p
= − ∏ , is less than the corresponding physical
probability.
The logic for setting αx = 0 when calculating the p0i’s is that in a risk-neutral world, the
expected rates of return on all assets would be the same and equal to the risk-free return. If the
prices of assets and liabilities are normalized by the price of the bond mutual fund, Bt,a sw ed i d
for the insurer’s liability in equation (7), then the bond fund’s normalized share price, Bt/Bt,i sa
constant equal to 1. In this pricing system, the normalized bond fund is the risk-free asset, and its
rate of return is zero. Hence, the normalized value of bank assets, Vt/Bt, also has an expected rate
of return of zero under the risk-neutral Q measure. Since the bond mutual fund earns a return
identical to that of the bank’s deposits (their durations are identical), the expected rate of return
on normalized bank assets also equals αx= αv-αd+σd
2-σvd, which under the risk-neutral Q measure
must then be zero.
22 Equation (15) is the result of applying Itô’s lemma.
23 Therefore, calculating the probability of failure under the risk-neutral Q measure does not require an
estimate of the relative risk premium. Compared to calculating true failure probabilities, less information
and/or assumptions are needed.16
III. Empirical Results
Estimates of actual and risk-neutral annual failure probabilities, and fair and expected
value-based insurance rates, were computed using time series – cross section data on individual
banking institutions. The data consist of 42 commercial banks and bank holding companies that
had publicly-traded shareholders’ equity and that were listed continuously on both CRSP and
Compustat databases over the 10 year period, January 1987 through December 1996.
24 No
adjustments were made to account for the potential effects of mergers during this period.
25
Summary statistics for these banks are given in Table 1 at the end of the paper. Column one of
the table shows that these banks are relatively large in size, with the mean and median of year-end
1996 total liabilities of $34,083 million ($34 billion) and $12,104 million, respectively.
26 The
second column gives the proportion of 1996 total liabilities that are in the form of domestic
deposits.
27
An empirical technique similar to Marcus and Shaked (1984) was used to calculate each
bank’s market value of assets to liabilities, xt, for every month during the sample period and each
bank’s standard deviation of its assets to liabilities ratio, σx. This was done using data on the
market value and standard deviation of each bank’s shareholders’ equity, as well as the
covariance of its equity’s returns with changes in Treasury security rates. The procedure is
outlined in the Appendix. Table 1 summarizes the results, with column 3 giving the average
monthly value of each bank’s net worth to liability ratio, xt –1, and with column 4 giving each
bank’s estimated value of σx.
24 Estimates for banks that do not have publicly-traded equity can be obtained using the method of
Falkenheim and Pennacchi (2001).
25 Because the sample banks are the survivors of any mergers during this period, they would tend to be the
larger merger participants and be less affected. Since all of our banks’ risk characteristics are normalized
by total liabilities, any effect of mergers on failure probabilities and insurance premiums would need to
result from a change in a bank’s asset/liability ratio (x), target asset/liability ratio (x*), or standard deviation
of its asset/liability ratio (σx). It is not clear that mergers have any systematic effect on these risk variables.
26 Total liabilities includes all non-ownership liabilities, such as deposits and subordinated debt, but
excludes preferred and common stock.17
The estimated net worth or capital, xt –1, for these banks varied substantially over the
1987 to 1996 period, a time when the commercial banking industry experienced an increasing
number of failures followed by a strong recovery. The mean and median estimated capital levels,
as a percent of total liabilities, for the 42 banks over this 10-year period were 11.81 % and 11.32
%, respectively. The mean and median volatilities (annual standard deviations) of changes in
capital across the 42 banks were 3.14 % and 3.13 %, respectively. Banks with a higher volatility
of capital tended to maintain, on average, a higher level of capital. The correlation between a
bank’s volatility of capital and its average level of capital over the period was 0.3256. This
positive correlation is consistent with the notion that banks having riskier assets choose higher
levels of capital, either voluntarily or due to regulatory requirements such as risk-based capital
standards.
28
These monthly estimates of the 42 banks’ market values of capital were used to analyze
the extent of mean reversion in capital ratios. Consistent with equation (6), a time series – cross-
section autoregressive process of capital ratios was estimated (42 banks times 120 months = 5040
observations). Because of the evidence that higher volatility banks tend to maintain higher
average capital, when performing this regression each individual bank’s “target” capital ratio was
set equal to its sample average over the 10-year period. The resulting estimate for the mean
reversion parameter κ was 0.1766 and statistically significant at the 99 % confidence level. The
implication is that if a bank’s beginning-of-year capital ratio deviated from its target, then by the
end of the year it would be expected to revert 17.66 % back to its target. This mean reversion
parameter, along with each bank’s target capital ratio, were used in simulating the capital
processes required for computing insurance premiums.
27 Our estimates of fair and expected value insurance premiums are stated as a proportion of a bank’s total
liabilities. Because the current FDIC practice is to set premiums as a proportion of total domestic deposits,
information on domestic deposits is included for this purpose.
28 Flannery and Rangan (2002) also find that banks with greater portfolio risk tend to hold greater equity
capital. Their findings, as well as those of Ashcraft (2001), suggest that market incentives, rather than
regulatory requirements, influenced banks’ choice of capital.18
Using each bank’s capital and volatility estimates at the end of each year during 1987-
1996, 1 to 5 year failure probabilities were calculated, where the i
th year failure probability is the
probability that the bank’s net worth is negative at the end of i years. Both risk-neutral
probabilities and actual probabilities of default were estimated. Recall that the risk-neutral
probabilities are calculated by assuming the expected rate of return on bank assets and liabilities
are the same, equal to the short-term, risk-free interest rate. In contrast, the estimated actual
probabilities assume that the expected rate of return on bank assets exceeds that of liabilities by
0.985 % each year. This bank asset risk premium of 98.5 basis points was estimated from the
market returns on bank stocks, relative to the 30-day Treasury bill rate, over the period 1926 to
1996.
29
In addition to computing failure probabilities for the 1987 to 1996 period, we also
calculated each bank’s 1 to 5 year steady state failure probabilities. This was done by simulating
for each bank a 1,000 year time-series of its asset/liability ratio (one plus its capital ratio), xt.T h e
simulation assumes that a bank’s initial capital equals its individual target level, x
*,a n dt h e n
evolves randomly according to the processes given in (15) and (6).
30 Then, just as was done
previously for the 10-year period, 1987 to 1996, 1 to 5 year risk-neutral and actual failure
probabilities were calculated for each year during the 1,000-year simulation period.
Table 2 summarizes the results from calculating failure probabilities based on the 1987 to
1996 period as well as for the 1,000-year (steady state) period. The table gives the mean and
median failure probabilities across both banks and time. As expected, one can see that the risk-
neutral probabilities are always larger than the corresponding actual or physical probabilities.
The risk-neutral probabilities are higher because the effect of a bank asset risk-premium is taken
out. This is the correct probability to use for insurance valuation purposes, if one wishes to
29 See Pennacchi (1999 p.161) for details.
30 The simulation generates a 1,000-year time-series for each of the 42 banks. Each bank’s value of x
* and
σx are those estimated from the 1987 to 1996 period. Each bank’s risk premium on bank assets is assumed
to be 98.5 basis points.19
properly compensate the insurer for its exposure to systemic risk. In contrast, the actual
probabilities could be relevant if one wishes to calibrate some of the model’s parameters to match
historical bank failure rates. Table 2 also gives an indication of a skewed distribution for failure
probabilities. The mean (simple average) failure probabilities are much higher than the median
ones. Further, the 1987 to 1996 decade appears to be a relatively risky period for banks, since the
failure probabilities during this period are generally higher than for the steady state.
Figures 1A and 1B, which graph the average risk-neutral and actual first year and fifth
year failure probabilities from year-end 1987 to 1996, show that failure probabilities peaked at
the beginning of 1991 and then declined during the latter half of the period. Figures 2A and 2B
show the risk-neutral first, third, and fifth year failure probabilities for two individual banks: one
whose average first year failure probability ranked it at the median of all banks and one whose
average first year failure probability ranked it at the 75
th percentile. From these figures it is clear
that failure probabilities change more slowly for years farther into the future.
The next step is to calculate fair and expected-value insurance premiums using these
failure probabilities and the formulas in equations (3) and (4) above. To do so, one needs to
specify a bank’s expected growth in liabilities in excess of the risk-free rate, gd, and the FDIC’s
loss per bank liability should the bank fail, fb. Our calculations assume that each bank’s expected
liability growth equals the risk-free rate, that is, gd =0 .
31 T h eF D I C ’ sl o s sr a t ei sa s s u m e dt o
depend on a bank’s size. As reported in Table 3 of Oshinsky (1999), the FDIC’s average loss rate
for failures of top 50 banks during the period 1934-1997 was 3.2 % of failed bank assets, while its
average loss rate for failures of banks ranked 51-100 in size was 6.6 %. Thus, we assumed that if
31 This is slightly higher than the actual growth in aggregate bank liabilities over the sample period. From
1987-1996, total bank liabilities grew by 4.2 % while the return on a three-month Treasury bill investment
was 5.5 %. For simplicity, we have assumed that deposit growth rates are constant. However, the model
and the contract design can be modified to allow deposit growth to vary across time and to have the
overlapping insurance contracts cover different proportions (rather than each cover 1/n
th ) of total deposits.
As each new n-year insurance contract replaces a maturing one, the incremental amount of deposits would
be covered by the new n-year contract. Such a rule would result in new deposits being insured at a rate
reflecting the bank’s current risk, thereby reducing moral hazard incentives.20
a bank holding company had 1996 total liabilities exceeding $15 billion, which placed it among
the top 50 for that year, then the FDIC would experience a loss equal to fb = 3.2 % of the bank’s
total liabilities at the time of failure. For all other bank holding companies in our sample, the
FDIC’s loss was assumed to equal 6.6 % of a bank’s liabilities at the time of failure.
Table 3 gives the (simple) average fair and expected value insurance premiums for all
banks over the 1987 to 1996 period and during the steady state for moving average contracts
having n = 1 to 5 years. It shows that the average expected value premiums, which equal the
FDIC’s expected losses for the overlapping contracts, are over twice as high during the 1987-
1996 period as during a steady state. Recall that these expected value premiums were calculated
using the actual, rather than risk-neutral, default probabilities. There is a slight decline in the size
of these premiums as the number of overlapping contracts, n, increases. This could be due to the
effect of the bank asset risk-premium (98.5 basis points), which gives bank capital an upward
drift and tends to reduce the likelihood of failure over the longer-term contracts.
32
In contrast, one sees that the average fair premiums are higher than their expected value
counterparts and rise as n increases. This is what one would expect from theory. The fair
premiums use the previously computed (higher) risk-neutral probabilities of failure, which adjust
for the insurer’s (taxpayers’) exposure to systemic risk. Interestingly, the size of the deposit
insurance risk-premium, which is approximately the difference between the fair premium and its
corresponding expected value premium, increases with n. For the 1987-1996 period, the
difference is 4.2 cents per $100 of liabilities when n = 1 and 8.9 cents per $100 of liabilities when
n = 5. For the steady state, this premium equals 1.4 cents when n = 1 and 3.5 cents when n =5 .
The intuition for why the fair insurance risk-premium rises with the number and length of
the overlapping contracts, n, can be developed by comparing the volatility of fair and expected
32 In contrast to the risk-neutral distribution where both assets and liabilities have an expected rate of
change equal to the risk-free rate, for the actual probability distribution the expected rate of return on bank
assets exceeds liabilities by 98.5 basis points. This implies that, on average, capital will be above its21
value premiums. For contracts n = 1 to 5, the annual standard deviations of each bank’s fair and
expected value insurance premiums were computed for 1987-1996 and for a steady state. Table 4
shows the averages across the 42 banks of these standard deviations.
For both the fair and expected value premiums, the annual standard deviations decline as
n increases. This is the effect of a longer moving average. As stated earlier, as n increases, a
bank’s total premium becomes less volatile, since new information affects only a 1
n
th share of the
total premium. This decrease in volatility reduces the variability of premiums paid by banks, but
it also makes the difference between premiums received and losses paid out by the FDIC more
volatile. In other words, the variance of the net revenue received by the FDIC for providing
deposit insurance (premiums minus losses) increases with n. Under a fair premium structure, the
FDIC (taxpayers) must be compensated for this additional risk, and that is why the size of the risk
premium increases as n becomes larger.
The previous tables reported averages across the 42 banks. We now consider means and
standard deviations of premiums for the individual banks. Tables 5 and 6 report the average
1987-1996 fair and expected value premiums for each of the 42 banks. In both of these tables,
banks are ranked by the size of their average one-year (n = 1) premiums. The relative ranking of
the banks based on fair premiums does not differ significantly from that based on expected value
premiums. In both cases, the distribution is skewed, with a few high-risk banks paying
substantial premiums. However, it is clear that fair premiums are always at least as high as
expected value premiums for any given bank. These results are confirmed by Figures 3A and 3B,
which graph the fair 1-, 3-, and 5-year contract premiums for the median and 75
th percentile bank,
and by Figures 4A and 4B, which graph the expected value 1-, 3-, and 5-year contract premiums
for the median and 75
th percentile bank.
current level in the future. While the bank will tend to adjust capital downward if it is above target, the
adjustment is only partial.22
In Tables 7 and 8, similar statistics are reported but for the average steady state fair and
expected value premiums. Again, the banks are ranked by the size of their average one-year
premiums. In general, the steady state premiums are lower than the 1987-1996 period, but
skewness still is apparent. Further, those banks that were relatively risky during the 1987 to 1996
period continue to be relatively risky based on their steady state premiums. It is also noteworthy
that, as in the Table 3 averages, each bank’s average expected value premiums generally decline
with the length of its overlapping contract, n. However, also consistent with Table 3’s averages,
each bank’s average fair premiums increase with the contract length.
The last two tables, Tables 9 and 10, report each bank’s standard deviations of fair and
expected value premiums computed over the steady state. In each of these tables, banks are
ordered from lowest to highest in terms of the standard deviation of their one-year (n =1 )
premiums. Not surprisingly, banks that pay high premiums, on average, also have high standard
deviations of premiums. However, with only a very few exceptions, a bank’s standard deviation
of premiums declines monotonically with the length of the overlapping contract, n. This verifies
that our moving average approach acts to stabilize premiums. The lower volatility of premiums
for longer contract lengths is also evident from Figures 3A, 3B, 4A, and 4B.
IV. Conclusion
This study shows that fair insurance premiums can be estimated that are stable yet subject
to frequent updating. The methodology involves treating the insurance guarantee as a moving
average of several long-term insurance contracts. This proposed system satisfies a number of
desirable features expressed by bankers and regulators and should also be attractive to policy
makers that wish to avoid providing deposit insurance subsidies.
The system provides intertemporal smoothing a bank’s fair insurance premium, thereby
insuring the bank against paying high rates during times of financial distress. However, this
intertemporal insurance comes at a cost. The fair risk premium needed to compensate taxpayers23
for their exposure to systemic risk is higher the longer the average maturity of the insurance
contract. Essentially, more stable deposit insurance premiums result in more volatile net
revenues for the FDIC (and taxpayers): premiums will not rapidly rise to cover higher losses from
bank failures during financial crises. The result is that under a stable system of premiums, more
taxes need to be raised to cover FDIC losses during downturns in the banking industry. The
undesirability of raising taxes during a recession is what results in a higher required risk
premium.
In principle, an individual bank could choose the length of its moving average insurance
contract, trading-off a higher average fair insurance premium for greater rate stability. Bank
regulators, however, may wish to place an upper limit on the contract’s length, since a bank’s
incentive for moral hazard could worsen if insurance rates adjust too slowly to changes in its risk.
Such a policy would mimic how an uninsured firm chooses the maturity structure of its debt, a
choice limited by the discipline of market investors.24
Appendix
This Appendix describes how market value asset-liability ratios, xt, and their volatility,
σx, are estimated for each of the 42 banks in our sample. The method is an extension of Marcus




2ρσvσd, estimates of the parameters σv, σd,a n dρ are required. First, the parameter σd was
estimated using the technique described in Appendix B of Pennacchi (1987b). This procedure
analyzes changes in a bank’s total interest expense to estimate the proportions of its liabilities that
are of particular maturity classes. Specifically, it starts by estimating the effective proportions of
liabilities that are of 3-, 6-, 12-, and 36-month maturities by analyzing how a bank’s total interest
expense varied with yields on 3-, 6-, 12-, and 36-month Treasury securities. From these
estimated maturity or duration proportions, the standard deviation of the rate of return on total
bank liabilities, σd, is computed using the Vasicek (1977) model of the term structure of interest
rates. This was done for each of the 42 banks using interest expense data from Call Reports over
the period 1987 to 1996.
G i v e na ne s t i m a t ef o rσd,t h ev a r i a b l ext and the parameters σv and ρ can be estimated in a
manner similar to Marcus and Shaked (1984) and Pennacchi (1987b) using observations of a
bank’s market value of shareholders’ equity, its equity’s return standard deviation, and the
covariance between its equity’s return and changes in market interest rates. Define St as the
current market value the bank’s shareholders’ equity, σs as the standard deviation of its equity’s
return, and σsras the covariance between its equity’s return and changes in the short-term interest
rate, rt.A l s o l e t st ≡ St/Dt be the value of the bank’s equity per dollar of bank deposit. By
matching empirical estimates of st, σs,a n dσsrto their theoretical values, the parameters xt, σv,a n d
ρ are estimated. Approximating the value of bank equity as a one-year call option on the firm’s
assets leads to the equations
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The standard deviation of equity returns, σs, and the covariance of equity returns with
changes in the short-term (3-month Treasury bill) interest rate, σsr, were estimated using weekly
33 The implicit assumption of this approximation for equity is that only the first year cost of the deposit
might be unfairly priced. In other words, the current value of equity reflects future insurance premiums
that equal the cost of insurance for each year following the first. The approximation error in pricing bank
equity is probably modest, and even smaller errors in valuing σsand σsrare likely. The reason is that for
banks that are currently in strong financial condition, the value of deposit insurance, for both the current
and future years, is likely to be small or moderate. In contrast, for banks that are currently in weak
financial condition, the value of deposit insurance for the first year is likely to represent the largest part of
the total cost of insurance.25
CRSP data for the year 1996. Also using Treasury bill data over the period 1968 to 1996, the
standard deviation of the short-term interest rate was estimated to be σ = 0.0224. From Bank
Compustat, the year-end 1996 value of the market value of equity to total liabilities ratio, st,w a s
obtained for each bank. Then inserting the values st, σs, σsr, σ,a n dσd into (A.1) to (A.3), these
three non-linear equations were solved to obtain each bank’s year-end 1996 value of xt and its
parameters σv and ρ. From these estimates, each bank’s value of σx
2 ≡ σv
2 + σd
2 -2 ρσvσd was
determined. Lastly, CRSP and Compustat data were used to create a time series of monthly
market value of equity to liability ratios, st, for each bank over the period 1987 through 1996.
Inserting each bank’s σx and st into (A1) then allowed us to solve for the bank’s corresponding
time series of monthly xt values.26
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Table 1












Sterling Bancorp, NY 784 0.729 0.0975 0.0301
Mid America Bancorp, KY 1280 0.645 0.1418 0.0159
Westamerica Bankcorporation, CA 2310 0.901 0.1123 0.0295
Hubco Inc, NJ 2913 0.890 0.1183 0.0331
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc, TX 4509 0.941 0.0697 0.0439
Trustmark Corp, MS 4670 0.770 0.1029 0.0374
Firstmerit Corp, OH 4704 0.894 0.1447 0.0352
Riggs National Corp, DC 4709 0.780 0.0530 0.0337
Wilmington Trust Corp, DE 5100 0.767 0.2206 0.0324
Deposit Guaranty Corp, MS 5802 0.883 0.0959 0.0261
Mercantile Bankshares Corp, MD 5807 0.920 0.1876 0.0393
Zions Bancorp, UT 5978 0.742 0.1028 0.0401
First Virginia Banks Inc, VA 7365 0.956 0.1549 0.0248
First Citizens Bancshares Inc, NC 7440 0.935 0.0824 0.0264
Hibernia Corp, LA 8370 0.926 0.1167 0.0392
First Commerce Corp New Orleans, LA 8466 0.861 0.0940 0.0231
Commerce Bancshares Inc, MO 8774 0.931 0.1108 0.0276
Star Banc Corp, OH 9239 0.849 0.1413 0.0321
First American Corp, TN 9531 0.808 0.0974 0.0260
Old Kent Financial Corp, MI 11653 0.863 0.1172 0.0225
First Tennessee National Corp, TN 12104 0.746 0.1098 0.0379
Marshall & Ilsley Corp, WI 13502 0.802 0.1485 0.0325
First Security Corp, UT 13567 0.696 0.1073 0.0268
Union Planters Corp, TN 13870 0.828 0.0920 0.0352
Regions Financial Corp, AL 17331 0.833 0.1419 0.0226
Fifth Third Bancorp, OH 18405 0.774 0.2553 0.0570
Huntington Bancshares Inc, OH 19340 0.671 0.1187 0.0192
Northern Trust Corp, IL 20064 0.492 0.1237 0.0316
First of America Bank Corp, MI 20278 0.871 0.0896 0.0233
Crestar Financial Corp, VA 21082 0.608 0.0985 0.0264
Southtrust Corp, AL 24488 0.707 0.0982 0.0292
Comerica Inc, MI 31591 0.699 0.1101 0.0310
Mellon Bank Corp, PA 38850 0.739 0.0956 0.0398
Corestates Financial Corp, PA 41799 0.766 0.1361 0.0432
Wachovia Corp, NC 43143 0.604 0.1518 0.0378
National City Corp, OH 46424 0.756 0.1228 0.0321
Suntrust Banks Inc, GA 47588 0.775 0.1380 0.0311
First Chicago NBD Corp, IL 95612 0.552 0.1113 0.0391
First Union Corp, NC 130119 0.714 0.0995 0.0263
Nationsbank Corp, NC 172037 0.633 0.0890 0.0365
JP Morgan & Co. Inc, NY 210594 0.041 0.0961 0.0144
Citicorp, NY 260296 0.212 0.0661 0.029329
Table 2
Mean and Median Failure Probabilities for 42 Banks
During 1987 – 1996 and During a Steady-State
Horizon
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years
Risk-Neutral Probability
Mean, 1987-1996 0.02159 0.01937 0.01801 0.01712 0.01643
Mean, Steady State 0.00834 0.00759 0.00834 0.00924 0.01007
Median, 1987-1996 0.00032 0.00390 0.00708 0.00953 0.01016
Median, Steady State 0.00180 0.00222 0.00294 0.00368 0.00439
Actual Probability
Mean, 1987-1996 0.01402 0.00913 0.00686 0.00572 0.00481
Mean, Steady State 0.00583 0.00364 0.00319 0.00299 0.00287
Median, 1987-1996 0.00009 0.00100 0.00150 0.00165 0.00161
Median, Steady State 0.00097 0.00074 0.00076 0.00078 0.00075
Table 3
Average Fair and Expected Value Insurance Premiums per $100 of Total
Liabilities for 42 Banks During 1987 – 1996 and During a Steady State
Overlapping Contract Period
n =1 n =2 n =3 n =4 n =5
Fair Premium, 1987-1996 0.121 0.137 0.147 0.155 0.160
Fair Premium, Steady State 0.047 0.052 0.056 0.059 0.062
Expected Value Premium, 1987-1996 0.079 0.078 0.075 0.073 0.071
Expected Value Premium, Steady State 0.033 0.031 0.029 0.028 0.027
Table 4
Annual Standard Deviations of Fair and Expected Value Premiums
Average across the 42 Banks for 1987-1996 and a Steady State
Overlapping Contract Period
n =1 n =2 n =3 n =4 n =5
Fair Premium, 1987-1996 0.180 0.140 0.111 0.090 0.073
Fair Premium, Steady State 0.166 0.144 0.126 0.113 0.102
Expected Value Premium, 1987-1996 0.123 0.084 0.062 0.047 0.037
Expected Value Premium, Steady State 0.130 0.100 0.081 0.067 0.05830
Table 5
Fair Insurance Premiums per $100 Total Liabilities
Averages from 1987 to 1996
Overlapping Contract Period
Bank n=1 n=2 n=3 n=4 n=5
Mid America Bancorp, KY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
JP Morgan & Co. Inc, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wilmington Trust Corp, DE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regions Financial Corp, AL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
First Virginia Banks Inc, VA 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002
Huntington Bancshares Inc, OH 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Mercantile Bankshares Corp, MD 0.001 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.016
Fifth Third Bancorp, OH 0.001 0.006 0.010 0.013 0.016
Old Kent Financial Corp, MI 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.013
Suntrust Banks Inc, GA 0.002 0.007 0.011 0.014 0.016
Wachovia Corp, NC 0.004 0.011 0.017 0.022 0.026
National City Corp, OH 0.004 0.012 0.018 0.023 0.027
Star Banc Corp, OH 0.006 0.015 0.022 0.026 0.030
Marshall & Ilsley Corp, WI 0.007 0.015 0.021 0.025 0.028
Firstmerit Corp, OH 0.008 0.021 0.031 0.038 0.043
First of America Bank Corp, MI 0.009 0.019 0.026 0.031 0.034
Northern Trust Corp, IL 0.011 0.021 0.028 0.033 0.037
Comerica Inc, MI 0.016 0.030 0.040 0.046 0.050
Southtrust Corp, AL 0.018 0.029 0.037 0.042 0.046
Commerce Bancshares Inc, MO 0.019 0.037 0.051 0.062 0.068
First Union Corp, NC 0.020 0.025 0.029 0.032 0.034
First Chicago NBD Corp, IL 0.027 0.055 0.073 0.084 0.092
Corestates Financial Corp, PA 0.030 0.051 0.065 0.073 0.079
First Security Corp, UT 0.037 0.059 0.071 0.078 0.085
Crestar Financial Corp, VA 0.041 0.047 0.049 0.050 0.052
Sterling Bancorp, NY 0.042 0.076 0.098 0.109 0.115
Westamerica Bankcorporation, CA 0.051 0.078 0.096 0.109 0.120
First Commerce Corp New Orleans, LA 0.071 0.083 0.091 0.095 0.098
First Citizens Bancshares Inc, NC 0.086 0.107 0.121 0.126 0.128
Deposit Guaranty Corp, MS 0.099 0.104 0.106 0.107 0.108
Nationsbank Corp, NC 0.108 0.141 0.160 0.171 0.180
Hubco Inc, NJ 0.124 0.120 0.117 0.115 0.112
Trustmark Corp, MS 0.150 0.192 0.217 0.231 0.242
First American Corp, TN 0.150 0.135 0.127 0.124 0.123
First Tennessee National Corp, TN 0.165 0.212 0.239 0.256 0.269
Union Planters Corp, TN 0.218 0.266 0.296 0.313 0.324
Citicorp, NY 0.258 0.274 0.283 0.287 0.291
Mellon Bank Corp, PA 0.316 0.330 0.344 0.357 0.368
Zions Bancorp, UT 0.345 0.399 0.432 0.456 0.471
Hibernia Corp, LA 0.456 0.417 0.395 0.379 0.369
Riggs National Corp, DC 0.963 1.034 1.057 1.071 1.078
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc, TX 1.197 1.309 1.396 1.468 1.54331
Table 6
Expected Value Insurance Premiums per $100 Total Liabilities
Averages from 1987 to 1996
Overlapping Contract Period
Bank n =1 n =2 n =3 n =4 n =5
Mid America Bancorp, KY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
JP Morgan & Co. Inc, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wilmington Trust Corp, DE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regions Financial Corp, AL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First Virginia Banks Inc, VA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Huntington Bancshares Inc, OH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Old Kent Financial Corp, MI 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Mercantile Bankshares Corp, MD 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
Fifth Third Bancorp, OH 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
Suntrust Banks Inc, GA 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
National City Corp, OH 0.001 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.006
Wachovia Corp, NC 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.007
Star Banc Corp, OH 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006
Marshall & Ilsley Corp, WI 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007
First of America Bank Corp, MI 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
Firstmerit Corp, OH 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.011 0.012
Northern Trust Corp, IL 0.005 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010
Comerica Inc, MI 0.007 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.014
Commerce Bancshares Inc, MO 0.007 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.014
Southtrust Corp, AL 0.008 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.011
First Union Corp, NC 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007
First Chicago NBD Corp, IL 0.014 0.026 0.032 0.035 0.036
First Security Corp, UT 0.014 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020
Corestates Financial Corp, PA 0.017 0.026 0.031 0.033 0.034
Sterling Bancorp, NY 0.018 0.025 0.029 0.030 0.029
Crestar Financial Corp, VA 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.012
Westamerica Bankcorporation, CA 0.022 0.029 0.032 0.034 0.034
First Commerce Corp New Orleans, LA 0.026 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.020
First Citizens Bancshares Inc, NC 0.038 0.038 0.036 0.033 0.031
Deposit Guaranty Corp, MS 0.046 0.039 0.034 0.030 0.027
Nationsbank Corp, NC 0.065 0.073 0.076 0.076 0.075
Hubco Inc, NJ 0.071 0.058 0.050 0.045 0.040
First American Corp, TN 0.082 0.060 0.049 0.041 0.036
Trustmark Corp, MS 0.086 0.098 0.099 0.099 0.096
First Tennessee National Corp, TN 0.095 0.107 0.112 0.114 0.112
Union Planters Corp, TN 0.128 0.134 0.132 0.130 0.127
Citicorp, NY 0.150 0.137 0.126 0.118 0.111
Zions Bancorp, UT 0.222 0.234 0.235 0.232 0.228
Mellon Bank Corp, PA 0.222 0.210 0.202 0.196 0.191
Hibernia Corp, LA 0.339 0.271 0.231 0.205 0.187
Riggs National Corp, DC 0.674 0.630 0.580 0.541 0.510
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc, TX 0.935 0.919 0.910 0.901 0.89532
Table 7
Fair Insurance Premiums per $100 Total Liabilities
Averages from Steady State
Overlapping Contract Period
Bank n =1 n =2 n =3 n =4 n =5
Mid America Bancorp, KY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
JP Morgan & Co. Inc, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Huntington Bancshares Inc, OH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First Virginia Banks Inc, VA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regions Financial Corp, AL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wilmington Trust Corp, DE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Old Kent Financial Corp, MI 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
First Commerce Corp New Orleans, LA 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.006
Commerce Bancshares Inc, MO 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.008 0.010
First of America Bank Corp, MI 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.005
Crestar Financial Corp, VA 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.008
Northern Trust Corp, IL 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.007 0.009
Suntrust Banks Inc, GA 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
First American Corp, TN 0.003 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.013
Star Banc Corp, OH 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.008
First Union Corp, NC 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.009
Deposit Guaranty Corp, MS 0.004 0.007 0.010 0.014 0.017
Wachovia Corp, NC 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.010
Comerica Inc, MI 0.006 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.014
Westamerica Bankcorporation, CA 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.014 0.017
Marshall & Ilsley Corp, WI 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
National City Corp, OH 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.012 0.013
First Security Corp, UT 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.015 0.017
Southtrust Corp, AL 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.016 0.018
Fifth Third Bancorp, OH 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.013
Mercantile Bankshares Corp, MD 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
Hubco Inc, NJ 0.016 0.022 0.027 0.032 0.036
Sterling Bancorp, NY 0.027 0.032 0.038 0.043 0.048
Corestates Financial Corp, PA 0.028 0.031 0.034 0.036 0.039
Firstmerit Corp, OH 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.029
First Citizens Bancshares Inc, NC 0.049 0.054 0.058 0.062 0.067
First Chicago NBD Corp, IL 0.052 0.054 0.057 0.060 0.062
Mellon Bank Corp, PA 0.055 0.066 0.073 0.079 0.084
Hibernia Corp, LA 0.064 0.076 0.085 0.092 0.098
Nationsbank Corp, NC 0.067 0.074 0.079 0.083 0.087
Citicorp, NY 0.073 0.081 0.087 0.092 0.097
First Tennessee National Corp, TN 0.098 0.108 0.115 0.122 0.127
Trustmark Corp, MS 0.111 0.119 0.126 0.132 0.137
Union Planters Corp, TN 0.117 0.128 0.136 0.144 0.151
Zions Bancorp, UT 0.166 0.173 0.178 0.184 0.189
Riggs National Corp, DC 0.362 0.410 0.439 0.463 0.484
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc, TX 0.548 0.594 0.617 0.634 0.64833
Table 8
Expected Value Insurance Premiums per $100 Total Liabilities
Averages from Steady State
Overlapping Contract Period
Bank n =1 n =2 n =3 n =4 n =5
Mid America Bancorp, KY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
JP Morgan & Co. Inc, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Huntington Bancshares Inc, OH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First Virginia Banks Inc, VA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regions Financial Corp, AL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Old Kent Financial Corp, MI 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wilmington Trust Corp, DE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First Commerce Corp New Orleans, LA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
Commerce Bancshares Inc, MO 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
First of America Bank Corp, MI 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Crestar Financial Corp, VA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
First American Corp, TN 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Northern Trust Corp, IL 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Suntrust Banks Inc, GA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
First Union Corp, NC 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Star Banc Corp, OH 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
Deposit Guaranty Corp, MS 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
Westamerica Bankcorporation, CA 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Comerica Inc, MI 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Wachovia Corp, NC 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
First Security Corp, UT 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
Marshall & Ilsley Corp, WI 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
National City Corp, OH 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
Southtrust Corp, AL 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004
Fifth Third Bancorp, OH 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
Hubco Inc, NJ 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.010
Mercantile Bankshares Corp, MD 0.011 0.009 0.008 0.007 0.006
Sterling Bancorp, NY 0.016 0.015 0.014 0.013 0.013
Firstmerit Corp, OH 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.011 0.010
Corestates Financial Corp, PA 0.019 0.018 0.018 0.017 0.017
First Citizens Bancshares Inc, NC 0.032 0.027 0.024 0.022 0.020
First Chicago NBD Corp, IL 0.036 0.033 0.030 0.029 0.027
Mellon Bank Corp, PA 0.037 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.037
Hibernia Corp, LA 0.043 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.039
Nationsbank Corp, NC 0.046 0.043 0.040 0.038 0.036
Citicorp, NY 0.047 0.043 0.040 0.037 0.035
First Tennessee National Corp, TN 0.068 0.064 0.060 0.057 0.054
Trustmark Corp, MS 0.077 0.069 0.064 0.060 0.057
Union Planters Corp, TN 0.078 0.071 0.066 0.063 0.060
Zions Bancorp, UT 0.121 0.109 0.100 0.094 0.089
Riggs National Corp, DC 0.258 0.248 0.237 0.227 0.218
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc, TX 0.429 0.413 0.394 0.377 0.36334
Table 9
Standard Deviations of Fair Insurance Premiums per $100 Total Liabilities
Computed from Steady State
Overlapping Contract Period
Bank n =1 n =2 n =3 n =4 n =5
Mid America Bancorp, KY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
JP Morgan & Co. Inc, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Huntington Bancshares Inc, OH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First Virginia Banks Inc, VA 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regions Financial Corp, AL 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wilmington Trust Corp, DE 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
Old Kent Financial Corp, MI 0.006 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003
Commerce Bancshares Inc, MO 0.008 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.013
First Commerce Corp New Orleans, LA 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.010
Crestar Financial Corp, VA 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.011
Northern Trust Corp, IL 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.012 0.011
First Union Corp, NC 0.021 0.018 0.017 0.015 0.014
First American Corp, TN 0.024 0.022 0.021 0.020 0.019
Suntrust Banks Inc, GA 0.027 0.019 0.015 0.013 0.011
Star Banc Corp, OH 0.028 0.023 0.020 0.017 0.015
First of America Bank Corp, MI 0.029 0.021 0.016 0.013 0.011
Wachovia Corp, NC 0.039 0.028 0.023 0.019 0.016
Comerica Inc, MI 0.039 0.029 0.024 0.021 0.019
Deposit Guaranty Corp, MS 0.047 0.033 0.029 0.027 0.025
National City Corp, OH 0.052 0.037 0.030 0.026 0.022
Southtrust Corp, AL 0.053 0.041 0.035 0.031 0.028
Westamerica Bankcorporation, CA 0.055 0.042 0.035 0.031 0.028
Fifth Third Bancorp, OH 0.063 0.046 0.036 0.029 0.025
First Security Corp, UT 0.069 0.051 0.039 0.032 0.027
Hubco Inc, NJ 0.078 0.064 0.055 0.048 0.043
Marshall & Ilsley Corp, WI 0.087 0.061 0.047 0.038 0.032
Corestates Financial Corp, PA 0.125 0.101 0.085 0.073 0.065
Sterling Bancorp, NY 0.191 0.147 0.119 0.101 0.087
Mellon Bank Corp, PA 0.192 0.171 0.152 0.136 0.123
Mercantile Bankshares Corp, MD 0.203 0.158 0.122 0.097 0.079
Firstmerit Corp, OH 0.203 0.147 0.114 0.092 0.077
First Chicago NBD Corp, IL 0.216 0.176 0.148 0.128 0.112
Nationsbank Corp, NC 0.237 0.200 0.172 0.151 0.135
Citicorp, NY 0.269 0.248 0.227 0.208 0.191
Hibernia Corp, LA 0.304 0.249 0.209 0.179 0.157
First Citizens Bancshares Inc, NC 0.364 0.332 0.297 0.264 0.235
First Tennessee National Corp, TN 0.435 0.392 0.351 0.318 0.287
Trustmark Corp, MS 0.448 0.364 0.304 0.263 0.230
Union Planters Corp, TN 0.450 0.368 0.310 0.266 0.232
Zions Bancorp, UT 0.582 0.491 0.422 0.367 0.324
Riggs National Corp, DC 0.902 0.874 0.826 0.778 0.732
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc, TX 1.097 1.033 0.955 0.883 0.82035
Table 10
Standard Deviations of Expected Value Insurance Premiums per $100 Total Liabilities
Computed from Steady State
Overlapping Contract Period
Bank n =1 n =2 n =3 n =4 n =5
Mid America Bancorp, KY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
JP Morgan & Co. Inc, NY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Huntington Bancshares Inc, OH 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
First Virginia Banks Inc, VA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Regions Financial Corp, AL 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Old Kent Financial Corp, MI 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
Wilmington Trust Corp, DE 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000
First Commerce Corp New Orleans, LA 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
Commerce Bancshares Inc, MO 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
Crestar Financial Corp, VA 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003
First Union Corp, NC 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003
Northern Trust Corp, IL 0.009 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.003
First American Corp, TN 0.010 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.004
Star Banc Corp, OH 0.014 0.010 0.008 0.006 0.005
First of America Bank Corp, MI 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.004 0.003
Suntrust Banks Inc, GA 0.015 0.009 0.006 0.005 0.004
Comerica Inc, MI 0.023 0.014 0.010 0.008 0.007
Deposit Guaranty Corp, MS 0.024 0.013 0.010 0.008 0.006
Wachovia Corp, NC 0.025 0.016 0.012 0.009 0.007
Southtrust Corp, AL 0.029 0.019 0.014 0.011 0.009
Westamerica Bankcorporation, CA 0.031 0.019 0.014 0.011 0.009
National City Corp, OH 0.033 0.020 0.014 0.011 0.009
First Security Corp, UT 0.037 0.023 0.015 0.011 0.008
Hubco Inc, NJ 0.045 0.031 0.024 0.019 0.016
Fifth Third Bancorp, OH 0.050 0.033 0.024 0.019 0.016
Marshall & Ilsley Corp, WI 0.056 0.034 0.024 0.018 0.015
Corestates Financial Corp, PA 0.095 0.069 0.054 0.044 0.037
Sterling Bancorp, NY 0.135 0.089 0.063 0.049 0.039
Firstmerit Corp, OH 0.149 0.095 0.067 0.050 0.040
Mellon Bank Corp, PA 0.154 0.122 0.102 0.085 0.073
Mercantile Bankshares Corp, MD 0.168 0.117 0.084 0.063 0.050
First Chicago NBD Corp, IL 0.171 0.123 0.095 0.077 0.064
Nationsbank Corp, NC 0.184 0.136 0.107 0.088 0.074
Citicorp, NY 0.209 0.172 0.146 0.125 0.108
Hibernia Corp, LA 0.239 0.173 0.132 0.106 0.088
First Citizens Bancshares Inc, NC 0.286 0.224 0.179 0.146 0.121
Union Planters Corp, TN 0.346 0.245 0.187 0.149 0.122
Trustmark Corp, MS 0.349 0.249 0.190 0.153 0.127
First Tennessee National Corp, TN 0.357 0.294 0.246 0.209 0.179
Zions Bancorp, UT 0.471 0.353 0.279 0.228 0.191
Riggs National Corp, DC 0.744 0.643 0.558 0.489 0.431
Cullen Frost Bankers Inc, TX 0.945 0.809 0.699 0.613 0.54436
Figure 1
An Example of Five Overlapping Contracts
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